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STATE REGULATION OF OIL AND GAS POOLS
ON STATE, FEDERAL, INDIAN
AND FEE LANDS
INTRODUCTION
In San Juan County, New Mexico, are two oil and gas pools, each embrac-
ing fee, state, federal and Indian lands. Both pools are being operated in con-
formance with special regulations established by the New Mexico Oil Conserva-
tion Commission.1 Joint ownership in leased lands and royalty interests is not
uncommon in the law of oil and gas, but it is a unique situation when not only
one, but two, producing areas contain tracts owned by all of the types of private
and non-private landowners known to the American law of property. The role
of the state regulatory agency under circumstances of this sort is the subject
with which this paper is concerned.
Part I. STATE REGULATION OF LEASE OPERATIONS
ON INDIAN LANDS
In the late 1940's oil was discovered in San Juan County on land adjacent
to that belonging to the Navajo Indians. The Indians leased their land in San
Juan County to non-Indian lessees, presumably using lease forms similar to
those suggested by McLane in his book, Oil and Gas Leasing on Indian Lands.2
The land was drilled and produced under regulation of the New Mexico Oil
and Gas Conservation Commission, which promulgated the plan governing
both Indian and non-Indian lands in the two San Juan Basin pools. 3 In the
fall of 1961 the Oil and Gas Conservation Commission issued orders, effec-
tive December 1961, shutting in certain wells on Indian lands if the operators
of the wells did not stop flaring gas. 4
The orders of the Commission probably will not be questioned. If the lessees
of the Indian minerals should protest the authority of the Commission, it is
likely that the Indians and the federal government will cooperate with the
state in its efforts to conserve oil and gas. 5 If, however, Congress does not act
1. Letter of November 12, 1951, from Richard S. Morris, formerly Attorney for New
Mexico Oil Conservation Commission, Santa Fe, New Mexico, to student editor, Natural
Resources Journal.
2. McLane, Oil and Gas Leasing on Indian Lands (1955).
3. O.C.C. Order R-2103, R-1800, R-1800-A, R-1882 (1961).
4. O.C.C. Order R-1800A (1961).
5. Despite disavowals by government officials (See note 92, infra), many state au-
thorities apparently think there is great danger that the federal government will preempt
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and the federal Indian regulatory agencies and the Indians refuse to cooperate,
the question of whether the state may regulate the production of oil and gas
on Indian lands as a part of their statewide regulatory program remains.
On this question there is no case authority.' Writers on the subject admit
that they are unable to make any reliable prediction concerning the courts'
answer to the question. 7 This paper will attempt to support the proposition
that the state has power to regulate oil and gas production on Indian lands.
Legislative Grants of Power
By the Treaty of 18688 a tract of land, subject to the control of the federal
government, was set aside for the use and occupation of the Navajo Indians.9
When New Mexico applied for statehood, Congress took steps to insure
that the Indians would not be subjected to state domination insofar as the
control of their lands was concerned. The Enabling Act of 191010 provided
that the New Mexico Constitution contain a provision disclaiming any rights
to the lands lying within the boundaries of an Indian reservation, and that
until the Indian title to the land was extinguished, it would be subject to the
absolute jurisdiction and control of Congress. Pursuant to the mandate of
Congress, in order to fulfill the statehood requirements, New Mexico adopted
Article XXI § 2, New Mexico Constitution, disclaiming any right to the lands
lying within the boundaries of Indian reservations so long as Indian title had
not been extinguished. The New Mexico Supreme Court has interpreted this
provision as meaning that the state lacked the power to govern either Indian
the control of the state over drilling and production on Indian lands. While the state
should have no objection to federal conservation regulation which imposes stricter
standards than do the state regulations, many state authorities believe that if the federal
government is allowed to assert its authoriy over the conservation of oil and gas on
Indian lands, it may someday completely oust the state regulatory agencies from Indian
lands. See Bennett, Introduction, Powers and Attitudes of the United States on the Con-
servation of Oil and Gas, 5 Rocky Mt. Min. Law Inst. 43 (1960).
6. McLane, supra note 2, at § 160. Bennett, supra note 2, indicates that a case ques-
tioning state jurisdiction has arisen in Colorado, and that the court found adversely to
the state. (However, he cites no authority and the writer has been unable to find the
case.)
7. McLane, supra note 2, at § 160, believes that the state has no power to govern
the production on Indian lands. Contra, Allen, State Conservation of Oil and Gas, 5
Rocky Mt. Min. Law Inst. 59 (1960).
8. Treaty with the Navajo Indians, 15 Stat. 667 (1868).
9. Although the treaty does not specifically grant to the Indians the minerals under-
lying the land, it has been held that a grant such as this one conveys to the Indians both
mineral and surface estate. Cohen, Federal Indian Law 312 (1942). Neither an Indian
tribe nor an individual Indian retaining his wardship status owns Indian property in
fee simple. The Indians do, however, have a legally enforceable interest in the land.
Title to the property is not treated as though the land were public property belonging
to the United States or as though it were the private property of the Indians, but it
has some of the characteristics of each of these types of ownership. Cohen, id. at 287.
10. Enabling Act for New Mexico, § 2, 36 Stat. 557 (1910).
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lands or Indians living on the reservation. 1' Consequently, since the passage
of Article XXI § 2, in the absence of an authorizing act of Congress, the state
has seldom been able to exercise jurisdiction over the reservation Indians or
Indian lands.1
2
Article 1 § 10 of the United States Constitution gives Congress the power
to make treaties with the Indians. These treaties have been held to have the
same dignity as treaties contracted with a foreign nation.' 3 Although Congress
has the power to enact legislation which conflicts with the treaty, neither Con-
gress nor the executive branch of the government may divest an Indian tribe
of land granted by treaty.'
4
The enjoyment of Indian property by the Indians has always been subject to
the policy that Indians are wards of the government and are to be protected
by it. Likewise, the alienation of Indian lands, including Indian mineral lands,
has always been under the strict control of the federal government. Further-
more, Congress has provided that no grant, lease, or other conveyance of In-
dian property should be of any validity unless entered into pursuant to the
Constitution. Incorporated tribes, however, have been given the power to lease
tribal lands. 15
Indian tribes are distinct, independent political communities and, as such,
are qualified to exercise powers of self-government. They derive this power
by reason of their original tribal sovereignty rather than by virtue of a dele-
gation of power from the federal government. The leading case affirming the
sovereignty of the Indians over their own affairs is Worcester v. Georgia.',
In that case, Chief Justice Marshall held that the federal government, as pro-
tector of the Indians, has complete control over Indian affairs, but the Indians
nevertheless have inherent powers of sovereignty which they can exercise so
long as those powers are not inconsistent with the actions of Congress.The Worcester doctrine has been modified to the extent that the states have
been allowed to assume jurisdiction over Indian affairs where essential tribal
relations will not be involved, and where the rights of the Indians will not
be jeopardized. 17 The Supreme Court has said that, absent federal legislation,
the test which the Court will use is whether the state action infringes upon the
right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and to be governed by
them.' 8
11. Your Food Stores, Inc. v. Village of Espanola, 68 N.M. 327, 361 P.2d 950 (1961)
State v. Begay, 63 N.M. 409, 320 P.2d 1017 (1958).
12. Tenorio v. Tenorio, 44 N.M. 89, 98 P.2d 838 (1940) ; Trujillo v. Prince, 42 N.M.
337, 78 P.2d 1451 (1938).
13. Worcesterv. Georgia 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
14. Am. Law of Mining § 2.32 (1960), Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1 (1899), 4 A.I.R.
1372. See also, Shoshone Indians v. United States, 324 U.S. 335 (1945).
15. Id. at § 2.33. See also 25 U.S.C. 474,477 (1958).
16. 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
17. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1958).
18. Id., at 220.
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In the case of Williams v. Lee,1" the Supreme Court indicated only three ways
in which a state with an enabling act such as New Mexico's 20 could exercise
control over Indian affairs: (1) If the exercise of these powers will not inter-
fere with essential tribal relations, and will not jeopardize the rights of the
Indians to govern themselves; (2) if Congress expressly grants it the power
to do so; and (3) if Congress has, by statute, given those states whose enabling
act prohibits them from exercising jurisdiction over Indian lands the power to
amend their constitution so as to accept jurisdiction over Indian affairs. 21
Thus, by exercising this power of amending its constitution, New Mexico could
confidently assert its authority over Indian affairs in this state.
There has been no act of Congress, however, which grants the State of New
Mexico the power to govern drilling and production of oil and gas on Indian
lands, nor has New Mexico seen fit to amend its constitution so as to assume
jurisdiction over Indian affairs. The express disclaimer of jurisdiction in the
New Mexico Constitution 22 remains intact.
If the State of New Mexico is to be allowed to regulate drilling and produc-
tion of oil and gas on Indian lands, the courts will have to find either that the
constitutional prohibition 23 no longer is applicable in determining the state's
jurisdiction over Indian affairs, or that the regulation of drilling and the pro-
duction of oil and gas on Indian lands does not involved essential tribal rela-
tions or jeopardize the rights of the Indians.
New Mexico Constitution, Art. XXI, § 2 provides:
The people inhabiting this state do agree and declare that they for-
ever disclaim all right and title to the unappropriated and ungranted
public lands lying within the boundaries thereof, and to all lands lying
within said boundaries owned or held by Indians or Indian tribes ...
and that until the title of such Indian tribe shall have been extin-
guished the same shall be and remain subject to the disposition and
under the absolute control of the Congress of the United States ...
(emphasis added).
If, within the meaning of this section, Indian title is extinguished, the state
will no longer be prohibited from exercising its jurisdiction over Indian lands.
The New Mexico court, in construing this section of the Constitution, has
never construed the word "extinguished" literally, although the question of
what constitutes extinguishment of Indian title has been before the court
twice.24 Each time the court has limited its rule to the specific conveyance which
19. Id., at 220,221.
20. Treaty with the Navajo Indians, 15 Stat. 667 (1868).
21. On August 15, 1953, Congress passed such a statute. 67 Stat. 590 (1953).
22. N.M. Const. art. 21, § 2.
23. Ibid.
24. Your Food Stores, Inc. v. Pillage of Espanola, 68 N.M. 327, 361 P.2d 950 (1961)
State 'v. Begay, 63 N.M. 409, 320 P.2d 1017 (1958).
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was said to constitute an extinguishment of Indian title.25 It has never said that
in order for Indian title to be extinguished, the Indians must convey the land
in fee simple. From the silence of the court perhaps we can infer that a con-
veyance of some interest less than a fee simple will constitute an extinguishment
of Indian title.
In Your Food Stores, Inc. v. Village of Espanola,'26 the Village of Espanola
argued that the Santa Clara Indians, by leasing some of their land to the plain-
tiff, had divested themselves of their right to possession, dominion, and control
over the land during the term of the lease. They further argued that this gave
the Village of Espanola the power to annex the leased land to the village and
to tax the plaintiff. The Court rejected this argument, holding that the mere
granting of a lease did not extinguish Indian title.
In State v. Begay,27 the defendant was arrested for drunken driving on a
highway constructed by the state across Indian land. The court held that the
state had a mere easement across Indian lands; that beneficial title to the land
still remained in the Indians. Therefore, because of New Mexico's constitutional
limitation, the state had no jurisdiction over the crime.
It is well settled that the granting of an oil and gas lease operates as a con-
veyance of an interest in real property. 28 One authority extends this rule to
apply to Indian lands as well. 29 The exact nature of the interest conveyed, how-
ever, will depend upon the theory of ownership of oil and gas which is applic-
able to Indian lands.
The two major theories as to the ownership of oil and gas are: (1) "non-
ownership"; and (2) "ownership-in-place." In non-ownership states, oil and gas
are considered fugacious minerals and the absolute ownership of the land
carries with it the exclusive right to drill on the premises and to retain, as
absolute owner, all of the oil and gas that is reduced to possession by produc-
tion. Under this theory the oil and gas lessee would take an interest similar to
an easement or a profit a prendre.30 The interest conveyed would be analogous
to that conveyed in the Begay case,3' supra, and granting a lease under this
theory would not constitute an extinguishment of Indian title which would
allow the state to assume control over the production of oil and gas from the
land.
In those states which follow the ownership-in-place theory, however, oil and
gas are considered a part of the land; and absolute ownership of the land carries
25. Ibid. But see Alonzo v. United States, 249 F.2d 189 (1957).
26. 68 N.M. 327, 361 P.2d 950 (1961).
27. 63 N.M. 409, 320 P.2d 1017 (1958).
28. Bolack v. Hedges, 56 N.M. 92, 240 P.2d 844 (1952) ; Terry v. Humphreys, 27 N.M.
564, 203 Pac. 539 (1922).
29. McLane, Oil and Gas Leasing on Indian Lands § 85 (1955).
30. Sullivan, Oil and Gas, § 12 (1955).
31. State v. Begay, 63 N.M. 409, 320 P.2d 1017 (1958).
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with it the ownership of oil and gas in place.3 2 This is the theory followed in
New Mexico,3 3 where also, an "unless" lease creates an indeterminate fee in
the lessee, thereby giving him an interest in the land sufficient to support a suit
to quiet title.3 4 And although the lessee is considered a co-tenant with the lessor,
the lessee has the dominant estate and the lessor the servient estate, insofar as
the use of the surface estate is necessary to carry on the operations provided in
the lease.35
Under the latter theory, to determine that the Oil and Gas Conservation
Commission has jurisdiction over Indian lands the courts will have to find:
(1) that the New Mexico theory of oil and gas ownership applies to abutting
Indian lands, and (2) that the granting of an "unless" lease extinguishes Indian
title within the meaning of the New Mexico Constitution. If extinguishment
is found, the prohibition of Article XXI § 2 will no longer apply, and the state
will then have the power to exercise its authority over those Indian lands which
are subject to oil and gas leases.
Although the New Mexico Supreme Court still adheres to the art. XXI § 2
"title method" of determining state jurisdiction over Indian lands,30 it has
admitted that jurisdiction may be obtained (despite the constitutional limita-
tion) through an extension of the Worcester doctrine.3 7
In Draper v. United States,38 the United States Supreme Court had the op-
portunity to construe enabling act legislation similar to that embodied in the
New Mexico Constitution. It said there that the statute should not be con-
strued as completely prohibiting state jurisdiction over Indian affairs, but should
be limited to prohibiting the state from exercising jurisdiction over lands which
had been allotted to the Indians, but alienation of which was still subject to
federal control. The Court concluded that, despite the wording of the enabling
act, the state still had jurisdiction over Indian affairs, subject only to the limita-
tion set out above and the Worcester doctrine.39
The Court in Kake Village v. Egan40 reaffirmed the holding of the Draper
case.
Draper and Williams indicate that "absolute" federal jurisdiction is
not invariably exclusive jurisdiction. The momentum of substantially
32. Sullivan, supra note 29.
33. Bolack v. Hedges, 56 N.M. 92, 240 P.2d 844 (1952) ; Terry v. Humphreys, 27 N.M.
564, 203 Pac. 539 (1922).
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Your Food Stores, Inc. v. Village of Espanola, 68 N.M. 327, 361 P.2d 950 (1961;
Valdez v. Johnson, 68 N.M. 476, 362 P.2d 1004 (1961).
37. Your Food Stores, Inc. v. Village of Espanola, 68 N.M. 327, 361 P.2d 950 (1961).
38. 164 U.S. 240 (1896). See also United States v. MeBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881).
39. United States v. Draper, 164 U.S. 240 (1896).
40. 369 U.S. 60 (1962). Metlaktla Indians v. Egan, 369 U.S. 45 (1962), and its corn-
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identical past admission legislation touching Indians carries the settled
meaning governing the jurisdiction of states over Indian property to
the Alaska Statehood Act in light of its legislative history. . . The
disclaimer of right and title by the State was a disclaimer of a proprie-
tary rather than a governmental interest ...
Following the Worcester doctrine as it has been extended in the Williams
case and in Kake Village v. Egan, it is not necessary to conclude that merely
because the locus of an event is Indian territory the exercise of state jurisdiction
is prohibited. Over the years the decision in Worcester has been modified to
allow state control over Indian affairs where essential tribal relations are not
involved and where the rights of the Indians will not be jeopardized. 41
The instant problem would seem to fit within one of these extensions of the
Worcester doctrine. The conservation of oil and gas is primarily a matter of
state concern. The state has the duty to conserve the mineral resources within
the state regardless of where in the state they may be situated.
Once the Indians have leased their lands for oil and gas purposes they are
relegated to the position of parties with only a proprietary interest in land.
When oil and gas is discovered and produced, they are entitled only to their
share of the proceeds of production. It cannot be argued that the regulation
of drilling and production on Indian lands interferes with essential tribal rela-
tions or jeopardizes the rights of the Indians. The state, under its police power,
is merely protecting the rights of the Indians as well as those of the state, and
is not trying to place them in a position inferior to that of state citizens.
It would seem that the jurisdiction of the state is concurrent with that of the
federal government, since Congress has not sought to preempt the state from
exercising its power over Indian lands insofar as the regulation of the production
of oil and gas is concerned. 42 Therefore, until Congress acts, the state. should
have the power to regulate drilling and production on Indian lands as a part
of a state-wide regulatory program.
JOEL M. CARSON
panion case Kake Village v. Egan were argued together. The Metlaktla Indians are res-
ervation Indians who are beneficiaries by special legislation which empowers the Secre-
tary of Interior to'protect their fishing rights. On the other hand, the Indians of Kake
Village are not reservation Indians and do not have the special protection of the Secre-
tary of Interior. In Metlaktla, the Court upheld the power of the Secretary of Interior
to protect the rights of the Indians and reversed the case in order that he might have
an opportunity to make such disposition of the case as he thought wise. In Kake Village,
the court upheld the power of the State of Alaska to govern the fishing rights of the
village. In neither case did the Court rest its decision on the fact that the Indians were
or were not reservation Indians.
41. Kake Village v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60 (1962) ; Williams v,. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1958).
42. See discussion at pp. 357-58 supra, Kake Village ,v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60 (1962).
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Part II. STATE REGULATION OF LEASE OPERATIONS
ON FEDERAL LANDS
In neither of the two New Mexico pools described in the Introduction did the
New Mexico Oil Conservation Commission exert its regulatory powers because
the various landowners' properties had been pooled. Rather, the Commission
had earlier recognized and designated both pools, for administrative purposes,
when only one or two wells had been brought in or were contemplated in the
two areas. When new wells were developed and the pools expanded, the Com-
mission merely continued to exercise the jurisdiction it had previously assumed.
Special rules and regulations were formulated for governing production and
operation of the wells constituting the pools, after the lessees had applied for
approval to develop the additional wells.43
Not in these two pools-nor, indeed, in any case concerned with federal land
in this state in which the Oil Conservation Commission has promulgated special
rules and regulations for development or production, or has created exceptions
to well locations or acreage production-has any question ever arisen with
respect to the propriety of the Commission's assumption of jurisdiction or its
exercise of regulatory powers.
Section 65-3-5, N.M. Stat. Ann. (1953) outlines the powers and duties of
the New Mexico Oil Commission. Included in that section is the following
language:
It shall have jurisdiction and control of and over all persons or things
necessary or proper to enforce effectively the provisions of this act or
any other law of this state relating to the conservation of oil or gas.
(Emphasis added.)
Undoubtedly this provision has given comfort to the New Mexico commis-
sioners who, almost since the inception of the conservation legislation, have as-
sumed to regulate development, operation and prdouction of oil and gas on
any and all lands located within the limits of the state. As a matter of practice,
however, the New Mexico Oil Conservation Commission has worked very
closely with the United States Geological Survey in formulating many of its
policies and it has, in the main, conformed its rules to government requirements
when establishing rules for development and operations on federal lands. 4 4
It is also likely that the state regulatory board has relied upon the provision
of the federal lease forms which requires federal land lessees to drill "in con-
formity with any system of well-spacing or . .. allotments affecting the .. .
43. Letter from Mr. Morris, supra note 1.
44. Letter, supra note 1. Also, see Malone, Conservation of Oil and Gas: A Legal
History (Murph ed. 1949) where, at 332, he states the proposition in opposite terms,
i.e., that "The USGS [which is charged with supervision of lease operations on federal
lands] cooperates fully with the Commission in having its operators conform to require-
ments equivalent to those of the Commission."
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area in which the leased lands are situated, which is authorized . ..by applic-
able law or by the Secretary of the Interior.' 45 (Emphasis added.)
The language of the statute, plus that of the lease forms, seems to indicate
fairly clearly that regulation by a state agency is contemplated by the federal
government, and is acceptable.
Quite obviously, however, constitutional questions exist in the state's exercise
of regulatory powers, insofar as the federal lands are concerned. It will be the
attempt of this Part II to determine what some of the answers are likely to be
should the matter ever be litigated.
The State's Police Power
It has long been recognized that state conservation programs constitute an
exercise of the state's valid police powers, 46 which may be applied to public land
areas within the state 47 "at least when there is no legislation by Congress on
the subject."' 48 As with other areas, however, in which state and federal laws
may conflict, the state cannot regulate if Congress already has legislated in the
area of oil and gas development on federal lands. 49 There are not particular
statutes granting general jurisdiction over public lands to the federal govern-
ment 5" but it has been suggested that the Mineral Leasing Act 5 ' is an expres-
sion of congressional intent to create federal control over the production of
minerals sufficient to preclude regulation of the same subject by a state agency,5 2
at least as it pertains to development of the public lands.
45. Federal Leasing Forms 2-413 and 4-1158 § 1(c) (2), 43 C. F. R. §§ 192.42, 192.50,
192.54, 192.63 (1954).
46. Ohio Oil Co. v.. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190 (1900) ; Walls v'. Midland Carbon Co., 254
U.S. 300, 324 (1920) ; Patterson v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 305 U.S. 376 (1939).
47. McKelvey v,. United States, 260 U.S. 353, 359 (1922).
48. Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343, 346 (1918) (collecting authority).
49. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 315 (1819) ; Noh v. Babcock, 21 F.
Supp. 519, 522 (S. D. Idaho 1937), rev'd on other grounds, 99 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1938).
50. Hubbard, The Application of State Conservation Laws to Oil and Gas Operations
on the Public Domain, 32 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 109, 111 (1960).
51. 41 Stat. 437 (1920) (as amended, 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-263 (1952) and 30 U.S. C.
§§ 184-226(e) (1958).
52. Malone, Oil and Gas Leases on United States Government Lands, Southwestern
Legal Foundation Second Annual Institute, Oil and Gas Law and Taxation 309 (1951).
At 338, the author reports that "it is the position of the United States that the State has
no authority to restrict production" or otherwise control operation of Federal leases,
but that state regulation is permitted by the government as a matter of "comity." The
same notion is apparent in Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96, 100 (1928), where the
Court summarized the government's view, stating that although the Solicitor General
"does not concede the authority of the [lower] court to make this determination [that
the United States could permit its officers to kill deer within federal game reserves in
Arizona if the licenses were granted not in violation of state game laws] he is content
to let the decree stand."
One writer insists that in the absence of specific jurisdictional legislation, jurisdiction
over public lands, not acquired from or ceded by the states, within the state's boundaries,
must be reserved to the federal government in the state's enabling act or the land is
"subject to the ordinary jurisdiction of the State." Laurent, Federal Areas Within the
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Leaving aside the proposition that federal legislation in the future might oust
the state of the jurisdiction it now claims,53 it therefore appears that only the
Mineral Leasing Act now provides whatever jurisdiction the federal govern-
ment may assert.
Certainly the Mineral Leasing Act is "legislation by Congress" which, if the
required grant of jurisdiction is included within it, would supersede local police
regulations directed toward control of production on the public domain. Several
important cases reflect the theory that the power granted to Congress by the
Constitution to dispose of and regulate the property of the public domain pre-
cludes any state from exercising a similar power, whether or not the federal
government has so acted with regard to the property.5 4 The mere repose in the
federal government of the power to control, dormant though it may lie, has been
construed to be an exclusive power with which a state cannot interfere.55 Thus,
the government's conclusion that it acquiesces in state regulation merely as
a matter of comity seems to be supported by those decisions. With regard to
state conservation laws affecting mineral development on lands within the states,
a survey of some of the provisions of the Mineral Leasing Act might help to
resolve the extent, or limits, of the New Mexico Oil Conservation Commission's
power to regulate those pools which include lands owned by the United States.
The Mineral Leasing Act: Congressional "Usurpation of the Field"?
Section 1 of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 makes certain lands56 of the
public domain subject to lease by citizens, corporations, and States or Terri-
tories "under such rules and regulations as shall be prescribed by the Secretary
of the Interior."'5 7 Clearly, this authorization establishes the Secretary as the
agent of the federal landowner for executing the lease. It is not so clear, in the
absence of operating "rules and regulations" directed toward regulation of
the same subjects covered by local conservation statutes, that jurisdictional
control of conservation matters has been preempted merely by the authorizing
language of the Act.
Another section of the Mineral Leasing Act specifically recognizes the neces-
sity of preventing waste, and provides for forfeiture of the lease if waste is
Exterior Boundaries of the States, 17 Tenn. L. Rev. 328, 338 (1942).
53. "The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and
Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.
. " U.S. Const., art. IV, § 3.
54. E.g., Utah Po'wer & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389 (1917) (government
enjoined use of federal lands in Utah by defendant who had not secured permission of
government but was operating under state authority).
55. Pan Brocklin ,. Tennessee, 117 U.S. 151 (1886).
56. [L]ands containing [coal, phosphate, sodium, oil, oil shale, or gas] deposits owned
by the United States ...but excluding land acquired ... and those in national parks,
and in lands withdrawn or reserved for military or navall uses.." 41 Stat. 437 (1920),
30 U.S.C. § 181 (1958).
57. 41 Stat. 437 (1920), 30 U.S.C. § 181 (1958).
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permitted in violation of the section.5" To date no general federal conservation
statute has been enacted, but there have been occasions when the government
has issued orders or rules requiring conservative action by the lessee which had
not been required by the state regulatory body.5 9 Federal courts have upheld
the rules of the Department, and have construed them to have the force and
effect of law. 60 To the extent, then, that conservation "rules" have been issued
by the federal government, although they may be of specific rather than general
application, the courts have sustained the theory that there has been a pre-emption
of local statutes "in conflict" with the governmental rule directed toward the
same subject of control.
If the preceding reasoning be tenable, then the provisions of Section 30 and
32 of the Mineral Leasing Act cannot be reconciled with the decisions or inter-
pretations suggested, for in Section 3001 the proviso reads:
That none of such provisions 62 shall be in conflict with the laws of
the State in which the lease property is situated,
and Section 32,63 which confers federal regulatory power in this language:
That the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to prescribe necessary
and proper rules and regulations and to do any and all things to carry
out and accomplish the purposes of this Act. . . . (Emphasis added.)
also limits that authority by the proviso contained in the Section, which reads:
58. 41 Stat. 443 (1920), 30 U.S.C. § 225 (1958).
59. On October 10, 1958, the Department of Interior ordered the lessees and operators
of federal and Indian leases to shut down most of their producing oil wells in the Aneth
area of Utah because huge quantities of concomitant gas produced were being wasted by
flaring. The Utah regulatory commission knew of the flaring, and had permitted it.
Apparently both the state commission and the lessees accepted the order of the Depart-
ment without judicial protest since a report of the case does not appear in any of the
reporters (including Oil and Gas Report).
In Forbes v. United States, 125 F.2d 404 (9th. Cir. 1942), the court upheld an order
of the Department of Interior which required a lessee to plug a well if the lessee refused
to maintain it as a water well, and upon lessee's failure to comply, granted the United
States costs against the lessee for having to have it done by another. See earlier cases of
Hodgson v. Mountain & Gulf Oil Co., 297 Fed. 269, 273 (Wyo. 1924), aff'd 20 F.2d 1022
(8th Cir. 1927) (Dept. of Interior rule prescribing conduct of proceedings under the act
"considered as having the force and effect of statute") ; Hodgson v. Mid'est Oil Co.,
297 Fed. 273, 276 (Wyo. 1924), aff'd, 17 Fed.2d 71 (8th Cir. 1927) (regulations [pre-
scribed by the Interior Department] should be given the full force and effect of statutes,
when not inconsistent with or repugnant to the [Act] itself").
60. See cases cited in note 59, supra.
61. 41 Stat. 450 (1920), 30 U.S.C. § 187 (1958).
62. The provisions of the section which the proviso requires shall not be in conflict
with state law include: "Each lease shall contain provisions for the purpose of insuring
the exercise of reasonable diligence, skill, and care in the operation of said property; a
provision that such rules for the safety and welfare of the miners and for the prevention
of undue waste as may be prescribed by said Secretary shall be observed. . ....
63. 41 Stat. 450 (1920), 30 U.S.C. § 189 (1958).
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Provided, That nothing in this Act shall be construed or held to affect
the rights of the States or other local authority to exercise any rights
which they may have, including the right to levy and collect taxes
upon improvements, output of mines, or other rights, property of assets
of any lessee of the United States. (Emphasis added.) 64
Whereas Section 16 of the Act seemingly confers regulatory powers which
customarily have been considered complete and exclusive,65 Sections 30 and 32
appear to reserve primary, or at the very least, concurrent, jurisdiction in the
states.
The provisions of Section 30 and 32 are consistent with the recognition given
by Congress, in all legislation affecting federal lands since 1866,66 to the states'
jurisdiction and control over rights in non-navigable waters on the public do-
main. If there is a reasonable analogy between state regulation of water rights
and its use on federal lands, and state regulation of oil and gas production on
federal lands, then the disregard with which the federal government has held
state control in the water area in recent years has clearly evidenced the Court's
approval of the "pre-emption-of-the-field" theory. Under the powers of the
64. When Congress explicitly noted the state's right to tax as being included in the
proviso, it gave emphasis to longstanding federal recognition that there are many gov-
erning rights properly exercised by the various states, among which is the right to regu-
late in the interest of conservation.
65. E.g., Federal Communications Act, 48 Stat. 1068 (1934): "The Commission may
perform any and all acts, make such rules and regulations, and issue such orders, not
inconsistent with this chapter, as may be necessary in the execution of its functions";
Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 140 (1947): "The Board shall have authority
. . . to make, amend, and rescind . . . rules and regulations as may be necessary to
carry out the provisions of this subchapter." (Section 16 of the Mineral Leasing Act
is set out in the text at note 16, supra.) Where the authority of the NLRB was challenged,
with respect to its exclusive jurisdiction over labor questions involving interstate com-
merce, the Court held that the state's power was completely superseded, and it could not
act on a matter which the NLRB declined to hear if the NLRB did not specifically elect
to cede jurisdiction under a provision of the Act. Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board.
353 U.S. 1 (1957).
As one case points out, however, it is perhaps arguable that the "occupation of the
field" doctrine has no application to other than those fields wherein the constitutional
grant of power to the federal government is exclusive, "as in its right to protect inter-
state commerce and to control international relations." Albertson v. Millard, 106 F. Supp.
635 (E.D. Mich. 1952), quoted by the dissent in Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497
(1956). It is perhaps as valid to require that the pre-emption argument be available only
in those areas where the government has never permitted regulation by the states, viz.,
protecting interstate commerce or controlling international relations.
66. Mining Act, 14 Stat. 253, § 9 (1866), as amended, 16 Stat. 218 (1870) ; Desert
Land Act, 19 Stat. 377 (1877), 43 U.S.C. § 321 (1958) ; Reclamation Act, 32 Stat. 388
(1902), 43 U.S.C. § 383 (1958) ; Right of Entry Act, 26 Stat. 1096 (1891), 43 U.S.C. § 496
(1958) ; Black Hills Reservation Act. 34 Stat. 234 (1906), 16 U.S.C. § 508 (1958), and
Federal Power Act, 41 Stat. 1077 (1920), 16 U.S.C. §821 (1958). All of these statutes
either confirm appropriated rights recognized by state law, or declare that federal policy
or regulation shall not interfere with state control nor shall the Acts be administered
in conflict with state laws relating to control, appropriation, or use of the water, or rights
acquired under state laws.
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property clause 67 (which is the clause upon which the government rests its
assertion of jurisdiction over conditions of lease operations on the public land),
the Federal Power Commission was permitted to ignore local law in the issu-
ance of a license to construct a hydroelectric power plant on reserved public
lands, 6s although Section 27 of the Federal Power Act 69 explicitly provides
that state laws must be complied with before the Commission may grant such
licenses. If anything, the provision of the Federal Power Act which recognizes
state's rights is even stronger than are the provisions of the Mineral Leasing
Act. Yet the Supreme Court approved the action of the Federal Power Com-
mission, over the objections of the State of Oregon, on the theory that the gov-
ernment owns all the water flowing through public and reserved lands and can,
therefore, controls its development in whatever manner it decides, even in con-
flict with local laws and interests. 70
Another federal statute, the Taylor Grazing Act, 7' purported to reserve to
the states unimpaired authority to enact and enforce existing and prospective
local statutes pertaining to the public health and welfare, 72 but when the state
prosecuted a rancher under an Idaho law which prohibited sheep grazing on
ranges previously occupied by cattle, the Idaho federal court construed that
provision of the Act as not applying to the use of the "federal public range"
if the rancher had a federal grazing license. Rather, those licensees were sub-
ject only to
enforcement of the police power of the state where circumstances arise
as to the conduct of those bordering on breaches of the peace and the
67. U. S. Const., art. IV, § 3 note 12, supra.
68. Federal Po'wer Comm'n v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435 (1955).
69. 41 Stat. 1068 (1920),16 U.S.C. § 802 (1958).
70. Ordinarily, the FPC justifies its pre-emption of control under the navigation
power of the commerce clause (although the "general welfare" and "sovereign immun-
ity" theories also have been useful). Since, however, the Oregon river upon which the
plant was to be constructed was a non-navigable stream, the Court could not con-
scientiously rest its approval of FPC licensing on the "navigable stream" precedents.
It therefore made the distinction between "reserved" and "public lands" in deciding that
the government had a superior proprietary right which, under the argument of Nebraska
v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945), were never surrendered to the states under the 1866
and subsequent acts, but merely subjected them to the control of the states so long as the
United States should acquiesce; and that as concerns a "reservation" (as opposed to
"public lands"), through which the Deschutes River flowed, the Desert Land Act of
1877 had no application. This distinction, despite the specific and unambiguous proviso in
Desert Land Act that surplus ,water supply on the public lands, not navigable, remain
free for appropriation and use of the public, subject to existing rights!
71. 48 Stat. 1269 (1934),43 U.S.C.§ 315 (1958).
72. "Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as restricting the respective States
from enforcing any and all statutes enacted for police regulations, nor shall the police
power of the respective States be, by this chapter, impaired or restricted, and all laws
heretofore enacted by the respective States or any thereof, or that may hereafter be
enacted as regards public health or public welfare, shall at all times be in full force and
effect." 48 Stat. 1275, 43 U.S.C. § 315n (1958).
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avoidance of physical conflicts between cattle and sheep owners in case
of invasion of cattle ranges by sheep herders, and in the protection of
the health or public welfare,
and the police power was then applicable only "when not in conflict with the
Federal Constitution or statutes." 73 The court said further:
The Taylor Grazing Act grants exclusive authority to the Secretary
of the Interior to grant permits or licenses for the use of grazing live-
stock upon the federal public domain, and, when that is done, one
having such a permit or license to graze sheep upon a designated range
is protected from any attempt of the state to exclude such use by him
of the public range. 74
To paraphrase this sort of language and apply it to state rules of oil well
production and operation which may be contrary to the operational terms of
the lease granted under the Mineral Leasing Act, the result inescapably would
be a finding that the Act protects the lessee "from any attempt of the state to
[prevent] such use by him of the public [mineral deposits]."
A recent decision sets up three criteria for finding exclusive jurisdiction in
the federal government, where a state statute proscribes the same conduct as is
covered by a federal statute.7 5 Chief Justice Warren stated the first test to be
whether "the scheme of federal regulation is so pervasive as to make reasonable
inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.''76 Obvi-
ously this test is not met in the field of conservation regulation of oil and gas
production, since the federal government has promulgated only the Connally
Hot Oil Act 77 (which is considered a conservation measure as well as an exer-
cise of the power to regulate interstate commerce). Also, it has issued orders
or regulations affecting conservation on only a very few occasions, and even
these have been of specific rather than general application. 78 It is apparent that
Congress and the Department of Interior have, indeed, "left room for the States
to supplement" the existing federal conservation legislation.
As a second test, Chief Justice Warren indicates that where federal statutes
"touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant" the federal system
is assumed "to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject."7 ' Once
again, it cannot truly be said that federal interest dominates in the area of oil
and gas conservation, else why has the federal government been content to ex-
tend "comity" to state regulation without also attempting to assert that domi-
nant interest by supplementing the "Hot Oil" Act with additional legislation?
73. Nok v. Babcock, 21 F. Supp. 519 (S. D. Idaho 1937), at 522.
74. Ibid.
75. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1955).
76. Id., at 502.
77. 49 Stat. 30 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 715 (1958).
78. See note 59, supra.
79. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 504 (1955).
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It might also be noted that even the "Hot Oil" Act is a recognition of state
conservation legislation, for the "contraband oil" which is prohibited from being
shipped in interstate commerce is defined by the Act to be that oil available in
excess of the proration laws of the states. This recognition of the limitations set
by the states can be interpreted as a tacit acknowledgment of the state's domi-
nant interest in conservation.
The third touchstone applied by the Chief Justice is whether enforcement
of state acts presents "serious danger of conflict with the administration of the
federal program.""s It would magnify the roles which limited legislation and
conservation orders by the federal government have played to classify those acts
as a "federal program."
Accordingly, under Chief Justice Warren's analysis in the Nelson case, s" the
claim of federal "occupation of the field" would necessarily fall.
Unfortunately, nothing is gained by resolving the question of pre-emption.
Although the answer supports the state's control as a proper exercise of its police
powers, it does not sustain the argument that the state's control is exclusive.
Nor does it aid in concluding that the right exercised by the state is one that
would prevail over future conservation measures enacted by the federal gov-
ernment, if those laws are passed pursuant to constitutional authority. None of
the state's assertions of superior or exclusive jurisdiction, therefore, are valid
unless the state can invoke the doctrines of estoppel or waiver to support its
claims.
Acquiescence, Estoppel and Waiver
The argument that the government is estopped by its non-action has not often
been made,8 2 and no cases have been found in which the assertion prevailed.
A state attempting to rely on the long acquiescence of the United States, to
prevent its present declaration of federal control, would be faced with the dis-
couraging result in a case which is peculiarly analgous. In Light v. United
States,8 3 a Colorado rancher permitted his cattle to graze on the public lands
for a long period of time before the government insisted that he obtain the
permit required by a federal statute for such use of the land. He refused, and
asserted that the government's knowledge and acquiescence in his prior con-
duct estopped it from enforcing an injunction against his grazing usage. But
the government's failure to object conferred no vested right on the user, said
the Court, nor did it "deprive the United States of recalling any implied license
under which the land had been used"8 4 because "the United States can prohibit
absolutely or fix the terms on which its property may be used." 8 5
80. Id., at 505.
81. Pennsylvanian v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1955).
82. United States v. Kirkpatrick, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 720 (1824). See text at notes 83,
84, and 85 infra.
83. 220 U.S. 523 (1911).
84. Id., at 535.
85. Id., at 536.
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In an early suit by the United States for recovery of proceeds from an illegal
sale of government property, laches was pleaded as the defense.86 The Court
said there that, despite several years' delay in bringing suit, laches was no bar
to recovery8 7 since, in such situations, the rule "Nullum tempus occurrit regi"
applied.88
In Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States 89 the government sought per-
manent injunction against the plaintiff's occupancy of public lands without its
permission, although the occupancy was in accord with state regulation. The
plaintiff urged that it had expended huge sums of money in construction, with
the presumed knowledge of the government, and that the United States "neither
objected to nor protested against the use of its land."90 The Court observed
that "long acquiescence does not legalize an unwarranted appropriation." In
that case, plaintiff purported to act in the name of the state of Utah."' Pre-
sumably, the same observation would apply to any argument of acquiescence
actually made by a state conservation commission. 92
Conclusion
A survey of the cases yields little that is helpful in support of a state's claim
to superior or exclusive jurisdiction in conservation matters, as they affect fed-
eral lands within its boundaries. As we have seen above in other connections,
constitutional questions of the federal power to supervise and prescribe the opera-
tions which may be conducted on public lands invariably have been answered in
favor of the United States.93 The property clause of the Constitution has most
often been relied upon to justify the government's assertion of power, but it is
86. Steele v. United States, 113 U.S. 128 (1884).
87. Id., at 134.
88. "Time does not run against the King." Id., at 135.
89. 230 Fed. 328 (8th Civ. 1915), aff'd in part and rev'd on other grounds, 243 U.S.
389, (1917).
90. 230 Fed. 328, 339 (8th Cir. 1915).
91. Ibid.
92. States would have little difficulty in establishing acquiescence. Note, for example,
the remarks of a former Under-Secretary of the Interior in a paper prepared for delivery
before a western conference in 1958, in which he stated the Department's position con-
cerning federal jurisdiction, as follows: "Aside from the Congressional assent to the
Interstate Compact, perhaps the most specific and direct application of the Federal
powers in support of the states' conservation programs is that contained in the Connally
'Hot Oil' Act. But here again, the Federal Power is not exercised in usurpation or
invasion of the sovereign powers of the States, but rather in a direct method of imple-
mentation of those powers through approval of State limitations on supply to the extent
that they burden interstate commerce."
The Under-Secretary continued, with regard to the Department's shut-down order
in the Aneth area (see note 18, supra) : "It was not founded upon any purpose or inten-
tion to interfere with or supersede the exercise of the police pwoers of the State of tUah."
Bennett, Jurisdiction, Powers, and Attitude of the United States on Conservation of Oil
and Gas, 5 Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Institute 43 (1959).
93. See notes 83-86, and 89-90, supra.
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by no means its only weapon at hand. Several other provisions of the Constitution
can be invoked as its source of power: The Connally Hot Oil Act is an excellent
example of the power vested by the Commerce Clause-and the statute's con-
stitutionality has never been challenged in the Supreme Court. Dictum, at least,
sustains the General Welfare Clause as authority for the federal government to
disturb rights vested by the states "limited only by the requirement that [the
power] shall be exercised for the common benefit as distinguished from some
mere local purpose." 94 Under the power to declare war and provide for the com-
mon defense,95 this country has seen, in two world wars, how regulation of the
oil industry peremptorily be placed in the hands of a federal commission, and alll
matters pertaining to development and production subjected to its control.96
But even under the broad war power, which presented the only situations
identical to the topic under discussion, there was no clash between federal and
state interests. There never has been a case in New Mexico oil and gas history
where the superior jurisdiction of either the federal government or the state has
been at issue. Moreover, it is unlikely that such a case will ever arise.
The policy of this state, followed since the Oil Conservation Commission
was first established, has been to require the operator to obtain approval of the
federal government in all agreements pertaining to development of the public
lands. There are no cases to indicate that the United States has at any time
been dissatisfied with the conservation measures required by the New Mexico
commission; New Mexico has been willing and agreeable that its regulations
conform to the sort of regulations that the Department of Interior will approve,
presumably because it, too, approves the federal requirements. Furthermore,
with regard to pooled areas, the Mineral Leasing Act provides a means for the
state agency's exclusive control, of which the agency could attempt to avail
itself if it felt that such an expression of control is necessary or desirable.97
It is, however, difficult, and perhaps presumptuous, to predict future regu-
lation. An examination of precedent surely forces the conclusion that the fed-
eral government can indeed counteract state regulation of operations on public
lands if it chooses to do so. It is also true that present indications point toward
little, if any, possibility that control by the states shall be destroyed by federal
pre-emption. But encroachments made in the field of natural gas production
94. United States v. Gerlach Livestock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 739 (1949).
95. U. S. Const., art. I, § 8, cls. 1 and 11.
96. The United States Fuel Administration in World War I, and the Petroleum
Administration for War during World War II. A comprehensive survey of the federal
role during wartime is given by Ely, The Government in the Exercise of the War Power,
Conservation of Oil and Gas: A Legal History, 1948 (Murphy ed. 1949).
97. Section 17(b) of the Mineral Leasing Act, 30, U.S. §§ 226e (1958) contains the
provision that "Any [pooling] plan authorized by the preceding paragraphs, which
includes lands owned by the United States, may, in the discretion of the Secretary, con-
tain a provision whereby authority is vested in the Secretary of the Interior, or any such
person, committee, or State or Federal officer or agency as may be designated in the plan.
. .." (Emphasis added.)
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cannot be ignored, and some state conservation officials have less confidence
than the writer in a future federal "hands-off" policy.98 The Federal Power
Commission holds broad powers of regulation in the natural gas field of pro-
duction, transportation, and sale. These powers have been exercised to set the
price of gas at the wellhead, to regulate interstate gas pipeline companies and
to allocate markets among the companies. Its authority and regulations hamper
the exercise of regulatory powers of the various states with regard to natural gas.
It is not within the scope of this discussion to elaborate upon the influence of the
Federal Power Commission on state conservation measures since that, in itself,
could well form the topic of a separate paper, but it is fairly clear that such in-
fluences have not, as yet, either been directed toward nor felt in the areas of
development and production of oil.
Ultimately, however, the inquiry into the constitutionality of New Mexico's
regulation of oil production and development on federal lands-considering past
history of the federal-state relationship in this field, not only in New Mexico
but in all states where conservation measures are practiced-would seem to be
chiefly academic. In view of the parallel conservation goals of the federal and
state governments, as expressed in statutes, documents and in case law, as well,
and of the cooperative efforts of both governments as they have always been
expended in New Mexico,9 9 it is difficult to hypothesize the situation1 °0 that
would result in so marked a departure by either body from present aims and
methods of achieving them, as to create a change in their mutual confidence in
the present manner of control.
MARY C. WALTERS
Part III. THE LESSEE'S DILEMMA: DOES THE FORCE
MAJEURE CLAUSE SOLVE THE LESSEE'S RISK OF LEASE
TERMINATION WHEN GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION
RESULTS IN A CESSATION OF PRODUCTION AFTER THE
PRIMARY TERM EXPIRES?
In the area of the law dealing with relief from termination or forfeiture of
an oil or gas lease for the lessee's failure to strictly comply or fulfill his obliga-
98. In a letter from Mr. Morris dated February 23, 1962, for example, he raises the
point that "the Commission purports to prorate gas and otherwise control various aspects
of natural gas production," and concludes: "Our actions in this regard are somewhat
futile since the gas allowables that we establish are governed by purchasers' require-
ments which in turn are directly fixed by the Federal Power Commission. The FPC,
by promulgating a very few additional rules, could substantially destroy all of the
State's power to regulate natural gas-and it would be but one step further for that body
to assume jurisdiction of oil production."
99. See text at notes 44 and 92, supra.
100. With the exception, of course, of the occasion when the government should
exercise its war power, in which case it is highly unlikely that the government's policies
and production requirements would be so repugnant that the state agency would protest
its orders thereunder.
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tions under the terms of the lease, "the general conclusion seems to be that
equity will grant relief from termination of an 'unless' lease, or from forfeiture
of an 'or' or other lease, for non-payment of delay rental, where it appears the
leaseholder had fully intended to pay the full amount, but, without gross negli-
gence, and because of accident, mistake, inadvertence, mischance, etc., failed to
do so strictly on time."'' 0
In this same area courts have been willing to grant relief to the lessee when
he is faced with losing his lease because of his inability to comply strictly with
its terms as a result of unforeseen natural or mechanical forces.' 02 Thus, when
production must temporarily cease after the expiration of the primary term
because of such unforeseen forces, the courts tend to deny cancellation of the
lease.10 3 But when cessation of production after the primary term expires as
the result of promulgation and enforcement of governmental regulations, the
lessee has not been treated so favorably in many instances. The law is far from
settled in this particular situation; but certain steps may be available to the
lessee for his protection.
In the context of this symposium, perhaps the most pressing question is:
What is ihe oil and gas lessee's legal position when a state regulatory board
issues an order which results in the cessation of production after the primary
term of the lease has expired? A related question is: When the cessation of
production is due to the issuance and enforcement of an invalid order, is the
lessee's legal position different from that where the cessation is the result of
the issuance and enforcement of a valid order?
Before attempting to determine the lessee's liabilities in the situations above,
the authority in the state to regulate the oil and gas industry must be admitted.
Courts have consistently held that the police power of the state includes not
only power to regulate for the promotion of public health, good morals and
good order, but also the right to regulate and promote development of industry
and the utilization of natural resources so necessary to the wealth and prosperity
of the state. 10 4 Thus, in Superior Oil Co. v. Foote,0 5 it was held "that the state
may enact regulatory laws for and prescribe methods of extracting oil and gas
for the purposes of conservation, the efficient utilization of reservoir energy, and
the protection of the correlative rights of all owners in a common source of
supply. But the statute must not be arbitrary or unreasonable, and the regula-
tion must have a direct, substantial, and reasonable relation to the statutory
purpose." Morevore, it was held in Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil &
101. 5 A.L.R.2d 993, 994-95.
102. Sheinberg, "The Force Majeure Clause: A Tool For Mitigating the Effect of the
Determinable Fee Concept of the Modern Oil and Gas Lease," 6 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 269,
271 (1959).
103. Saulsberry v,. Siegel, 221 Ark. 152, 252 S.W.2d 834, 835 (1952); Reynolds v.
McNeill, 218 Ark. 453, 236 S.W.2d 723 (1951) ; Watson v. Rochmill, 137 Tex. 565, 155
S.W.2d 783, 784 (1941) ; Fick v. Wilson, 349 S.W.2d 622, 625 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
104. Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana (No. 1), 177 U.S .190 (1900).
105. 214 Miss. 857, 59 So.2d 85, 93 (1952).
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Gas Co.106 that a statutory grant of power to a state board to regulate the tak-
ing of natural gas from a common source of supply, to prevent waste, protect
the public interest and the interest of those having a right to produce from the
common source, is not invalid as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment or
the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution.
Effect of Valid Governmental Interference With Lease Provisions
Most oil and gas leases today provide, in the habendum clause, that the lease
shall remain in force for a certain number of years as the primary term; and
shall continue in force after the primary term so long as oil, gas, or other min-
eral is produced by the lessee from the land. Under such a habendum clause,
does the lease terminate upon the cessation of production, after the expiration
of the primary term, when cessation is the result of valid governmental
interference ?
In Clifton v. Koontz 107 the court denied cancellation of the lease. Although
the habendum clause did not expressly provide that production must continue in
paying quantities, the lessor sought cancellation of the lease upon the theory
that production in paying quantities had ceased, since the lessee had operated
the lease "in the red" over a 16-month period. Evidence established that rules
and regulations of the state regulatory commission resulted in the limited pro-
duction and that, but for these rules and regulations, sufficient production could
have been obtained to show a profit.
The court agreed with the lessor that production in paying quantities must
continue because such an obligation arose from "the law or natural equity,"108
but felt the lower court was clothed with a great latitude of discretion in decid-
ing whether an existing well on a lease had or had not ceased to produce in
paying quantities. 109 The appellate court agreed; and held that the trial court
was entitled to take into consideration the effect of the rules and regulations
of the state regulatory commission upon production, and to conclude that, but
for such rules and regulations, a profitable production would have been possible
to obtain. This latter conclusion, perhaps, presents the main reason for the
court's denying a cancellation of the lease.
Nevertheless, the Kansas Supreme Court, in Berline v. Waldschmidt,110
denied lessee's petition to extend the terms of a mineral lease, which would
otherwise expire, for the period of time that war-time regulations made it
unlawful to drill a test well on the leased land. The specific question involved
was whether a court of equity could and should extend or suspend the running
of the term of a mineral deed under circumstances of this nature."' The lessee
contended that application of the equitable doctrine of "commercial frustration"
106. 340 U.S. 179 (1950).
107. 305 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
108. Id. at 788.
109. Ibid.
110. 159 Kan. 585, 156 P.2d 865 (1945).
111. Id. at 867.
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required the court to suspend operation of the contract and extend its terms for
the period of time that he was precluded by war-time regulations from drilling
a test well on the land, until it was again lawful to drill on a five-acre tract.
The court, however, ruled that the particular circumstances and conditions
of each case would govern whether the doctrine would apply, noting that or-
dinarily it would be relevant to excuse payment by the defaulting party where
the object or purpose of a contract was frustrated or its enjoyment prevented
by law. While recognizing that the doctrine was developed to give relief to the
parties in a situation where they could not reasonably protect themselves against
the happening of subsequent events through the terms of the contract, the court
held that it has no application in a situation where the subsequent event alleged
to have caused the frustration was reasonably foreseeable, and could have been
controlled by the contract.' 2
The use of a force majeure clause was in that case considered to be the proper
vehicle for avoiding this particular contingency, or any other which could have
been reasonably foreseen or controlled. Through failure to include the force
majeure clause, the court held that the lessee assumed the risk of government
regulation, because it was foreseeable. As a result, the doctrine of commercial
frustration was not permitted as a defense.113
Although there are no cases in New Mexico involving an oil and gas lessee
prevented by governmental regulation from performing according to the terms
of the lease, an analogous situation was decided in Wood v. Bartolino.1 14 In
New Mexico, if a lease "by its terms provides that the lease shall extend for a
period of five years, and as long thereafter as oil and gas, or either of them,
is produced by the lessee," it conveys real property.n 5 Also, it is settled New
Mexico law that a leasehold for a term of years is an interest in land.""
In the Wood case the defendant leased a building for a term of years to be
used solely as a filling station. Shortly thereafter, government war-time rules,
regulations, and orders froze sales of automobiles, tires and tubes, and rationed
the sale of gasoline, and the operation of the filling station became unprofit-
able." 7 The lessee, attempting to abandon the business, argued that the lease
had been terminated because of commercial frustration resulting from the gov-
ernment war-time regulations. Instead of denying relief on the theory that
the lessee assumed the risk of government regulation (as the Kansas court did
in Berline v. Waldschmidt, supra), the court held that the doctrine of com-
112. Ibid.
113. Id., at 868-69.
114. 48 N.M. 175, 146 P.2d 883 (1944).
115. Terry v. Humphreys, 27 N.M. 564, 575-76, 203 Pac. 539 (1922).
116. State ex rel. Truitt v. District Court, 44 N.M. 16, 27, 96 P.2d 710, 715 (1939).
117. 48 N.M. 175, 177, 146 P.2d 883, 884 (1944). "The parties, at the time the lease
contract was entered into, did not contemplate, and could not reasonably have contem-
plated, that such laws, rules and regulations would be enacted, promulgated or enforced,
or that they would materially and substantially change the conditions of the business
operated in the leased premises."
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mercial frustration was not applicable to release a lessee from his obligation to
pay rent, since the application of the doctrine was limited to those situations
where government regulations had either made the contemplated purpose of
the lease illegal, or prohibited it absolutely. The court expressed doubt whether
the doctrine should apply to a lease of an interest in land. This question was
not decided, since the court found that the government war-time regulations
did not absolutely prohibit the sale of gasoline, oil, tires, etc., nor did they deprive
the lessee of the use of the premises as a filling station.
Following the Wood case, it would seem that if an oil and gas lessee in New
Mexico is to be relieved of his obligation under the terms of the lease, when gov-
ernment regulations prevent him from performing, courts will grant relief,
if at all, only in those situations where the government regulations have made
illegal the conduct of business contemplated by the parties. However, even in
those limited situations relief might be denied, since it is still an open question
in New Mexico whether the doctrine of commercial frustration appiles to a
lease of an interest in land.
Haby v. Stanolind Oil and Gas Co."' is a case directly on the question of the
lessee's legal position when a state regulatory board acts without authority, and
the regulation results in a cessation of production. There, the lessors sought to
have the court declare an oil and gas llease terminated insofar as it covered their
land. The lease had a primary term of ten years which was to continue as long
as oil, gas, or other mineral was produced from the land under lease. After the
expiration of the primary term, the state regulatory commission issued an order
proscribing production unless the casing-head gas were put to one of four desig-
nated uses. The lessee found all four uses to be economically impracticable,
so it shut off the well for nine months, at which time the commission's order
was held invalid by the Texas Supreme Court.
A provision in the lease saved it from terminating if, after production had
ceased from any cause, the lessee commenced additional operations within 60
days. It Was this clause upon which the case was decided. Even though the
lessee's cessation of production and failure to commence additional operations
were the direct results of the Commission's invalid order, the lease was held
to have automatically terminated upon the expiration of the 60-day period. The
commission's order did not excuse non-performance.
The foregoing cases illustrate the courts' concern with whether courts should
confine themselves to a construction of the terms of the lease, or whether they
should apply equitable considerations which would avoid forfeiture in such
situations.
The Texas court in the Clifton case, supra, spoke as though it was apply-
ing equitable principles when it denied cancellation of the lease. However,
Walker" 9 insists that in Texas, where the oil and gas lease is a determinable
118. 228 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1955).
119. Walker, "The Nature of the Property Interests Created by an Oil and Gas Lease
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fee, equitable principles are theoretically inapplicable to the termination of the
lessee's estate which is effected by the habendum clause in the lease.
The United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, agreed with Walker in
Empire Gas & Fuel Co. v. Saunders,1 20 and the same court reaffirmed this
position in the Haby case, supra, i.e., that the equitable rule of relieving against
forfeiture has no application, simply because there is nothing to be forfeited
since the lease ceases to exist by its own terms.
Despite the fact that the Clifton decision is a very recent one, later than the
Haby decision, and that they may be irreconcilable, it may be possible to predict
New Mexico's course from these Texas decisions. Both states have many similar
rules of oil and gas law. For example, both follow the rule of "ownership in
place" in regard to the nature of the interest of the landowner, and the rule
that the oil and gas conveys an interest in land. It is probable, therefore,
that New Mexico courts will agree with Haby that equitable rules relieving
against forfeiture have no application to an oil and gas lease which requires
production to continue in paying quantities after the expiration of the primary
term, even though cessation of production after the expiration of the primary
term results from governmental interference.
If it is correct to refer to the doctrine of commercial frustration as a rule of
special equitable relief, 12 1 it would seem to follow that Texas, and probably
New Mexico courts, will hold that it is not applicable to an oil and gas lease.
If, instead, the doctrine is correctly referred to as a rule governing the con-
struction of contracts,'122 Texas and New Mexico courts will probably decline,
also, to hold that the doctrine is applicable to an oil and gas lease because of the
rule of strict construction of the various lease clauses, developed by the oil
industry, against the lessee and in favor of the lessor.
123
How do these conclusions affect the New Mexico or Texas oil and gas lessee
who holds under a lease that contains a habendum clause such as those discussed
above? Apparently, the lessee will be faced with the loss of his lease when gov-
ernmental interference, valid or invalid, results in cessation of production after
expiration of the primary term, unless he has some saving contractual provision
in the lease.
Effect of Force Majeure Clause-Fee Lands
The force majeure clause is a saving clause by which the lessee can avoid the
termination of his lease. Originally, this clause, being narrowly defined, was
in Texas," 8 Tex. L. Rev. 483, 515 (1930).
120. 22 F.2d 733, 735 (5th Cir. 1927).
121. Cheatham v. Wheeling & L. E. Ry. Co., 37 F.2d 593, 596 (S.D. N.Y. 1930)
Farlou Realty Corp. v. Woodsam Associates, Inc., 49 N.Y.S.2d 367, 71 (1944) ; See
Leonard v. Autocar Sales & Serv. Co., 325 Ill. App. 375, 60 N.E.2d 457, 462 (1945).
122. Dorsey v. Oregon Motor Stages, 183 Or. 494, 194 P.2d 967, 971 (1948).
123. The Texas Co. v. Ne'wton Naval Stores ,Co., Inc., 223 Miss. 468, 78 So.2d 751
(1955).
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restricted to acts of God, but the definition today is much broader.124 Typically
it lists specific conditions beyond the control of the lessee which, unless contracted
against, might result in termination of the lease. For example, some clauses
enumerate as exculpatory "storm, flood, or other acts of God, fire, war, rebellion,
insurrection, riot, strikes, differences with workmen, or failure of carriers to
transport or furnish facilities for transportation"; any "rule, regulation, order
or requirement of any governmental commission, body or representative having
or asserting jurisdiction"; and "any cause whatsoever beyond the control of the
lessee," just to name a few.' 25 Force majeure clauses may consist of one short
sentence or may extend to several paragraphs. The length depends upon the
number of conditions which will cause the clause to come into effect to relieve
the lessee of his obligations, and the detail with which the lessee's rights upon
the occurrence of the condition are enumerated. One author emphasizes that
great care should be taken in specifying the conditions which will cause the
clause to come into effect, and in specifying the rights available to the lessee
when one or more of the conditions occur, thus reducing the possibility of
litigation to a minimum.128
No reason is apparent why the lessee of fee lands should be unable to get
a force majeure clause included in any lease he enters into, since the lessee nor-
mally has the better bargaining position when dealing with a fee lessor.
State Lands and the Force Majeure Clause
When the lessor is the state, however, the lessee may experience difficulty
in obtaining a lease containing a force majeure clause. For instance, the state
of New Mexico uses a form lease 1 27 which the Commissioner of Public Lands
is authorized to execute. 128 It does not contain a force majeure clause, but it
does include other saving clauses, such as the one which provides that by paying
double rental the lessee may continue the lease in full force and effect for a
certain period of time1 29 even though production cease from any cause. Evi-
dently the lessee will be without relief unless the specific conditions occur that
are provided against in the saving clauses of this -form lease. He could, of course,
seek the Public Land Commissioner's approval to include a force majeure
124. Pacific Vegetable Oil Corp. v. C.S.T., Ltd., 29 Cal.2d 228, 174 P.2d 441,
447 (1946). "Force majeure" or . . . "vis major" is not necessarily limited to the equiv-
alent of an act of God, but the test is whether under the particular circumstances there
was such an insuperable interference occurring without the party's intervention as could
not have been prevented by the exercise of prudence, diligence and care."
125. Merrill, "Lease Clauses Affecting Implied Covenants," Second Annual Institute
on Oil and Gas Law and Taxation 141,191 (1951).
126. Sheinberg, "The Force Majeure Clause: A Tool For Mitigating the Effect of the
Determinable Fee Concept of the Modern Oil and Gas Lease," 6 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 269,
294 (1959).
127. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-3 (Supp. 1961).
128. N.M. Stat. Ann. §7-11-24 (1953).
129. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-3 (Supp. 1961) Covenant No. 15; See other saving clauses
in Covenants Nos. 2, 16, and 17.
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clause in his lease, but whether such approval can be obtained is a question
upon which there are no decisions.
Federal and Indian Lands and the Force Majeure Clause
When Indian lands are involved the lessee may also have difficulty in obtain-
ing a lease containing a force majeure clause because, again, although there are
standard form leases for Indian Tribal Lands, Allotted Indian Lands, Okla-
homa Osage Reservation, etc., none of these contain a force majeure clause. 130
Since the Secretary of the Interior or his agent is responsible for the general
supervision and administration of Indian affairs,131 the lessee is faced with per-
suading the Secretary to include a force majeure clause in the lease. How suc-
cessful the lessee would be is mere speculation.
The lessee will be met with the same problem when he attempts to lease oil
and gas lands from the federal government. Form 4-213 is the lease prepared
by the government for non-competitive leases, l32 for competitive leases, 13 3 and
for renewal and exchange leases. 13 4 This form' does not include a force
majeure clause and the federal regulations governing oil and gas leases on
public lands'36 do not incorporate such a clause by reference.
Now, suppose that the lessee leases oil and gas lands from the federal gov-
ernment but no force majeure clause is included in the provisions of the lease.
Let us assume, also, that production is obtained on the lease during the primary
term, and that after the expiration of the primary term the federal government
issues an order to the lessee to shut in his wells because his methods of opera-
tion and production are wasteful, even though he is complying with all state
oil and gas regulations.
This supposition raises two questions: (1) Can the federal government regu-
late the production of oil and gas from federal lands, even though the lessee
has complied with the state's comprehensive plan for regulation and conserva-
tion of production? (2) Does the lessee's lease terminate as a result of the cessa-
tion of production caused by enforcement of the order?
The first question has been discussed elsewhere in this article.' 3 7 Pursuing
the analysis of the federal government's right to regulate, it follows that the
lessee's lease will terminate in the absence of a force majeure or some other
saving clause. It is doubtful that a court would accept the only valid argument
the lessee could make: that since the federal government is responsible for the
130. McLane, Oil & Gas Leasing on Indian Lands, 278-300. (1955).
131. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1, la, 2 (1952).
132. 43 C.F.R. § 192.44 (1959).
133. 43 C.F.R. § 192.54 (1959).
134. 43 C.F.R. § 192.63 (1959).
135. The specific provisions of this lease form are set out in Hoffman, Oil & Gas
Leasing on the Public Domain 309 (1951).
136. 43 C.F.R. Part 192-Oil & Gas Leases (1959).
137. See Part II, supra.
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cessation of production and is a party to the lease, the lessee is entitled to relief
from non-performance for the reason that one party to the lease cannot pre-
clude performance by the other party which, under the terms of the lease, it is
entitled to, and then claim that the lease has terminated for non-performance.
Thus, although this principle is applicable where both parties to the lease are
actual persons, or where one party is a person and the other a corporation,
the government's assertions that it was protecting the public's interest and was
exercising a valid power to regulate undoubtedly would prevail.138
No doubt the same result would obtain with regard to leases of Indian lands,
since the Indians are wards of the federal government. Probably even a stronger
argument for the same result is the fact that there can be no dispute regarding
the federal government's exclusive jurisdiction over Indian affairs.
In New Mexico, because of the comity extended between state and federal
regulatory agencies, the lessee's position apparently is not very precarious, even
though he does not have the force majeure clause to insure his protection. So
long as this tacit agreement exists between the federal and state governments,
the lessee has little to worry about; but if this relationship should cease, the
lessee then will very likely lose his lease, in the absence of a saving contractual
provision. But when the lessee is dealing with a fee lessor, he can adequately
protect himself from the risks of governmental interference by including the
force majeure clause in the provisions of the lease.
Conclusion
The problems discussed above may also appear when all of the lands under
lease or a part of them are pooled under a compulsory pooling statute, or when
the lands or a part of them are unitized under a unitization statute. For a dis-
cussion of those problems, Mr. S. J. Sheinberg has written an excellent law
review article concerning the applicability of the force majeure clause under
those circumstances, 13 9 to which the writer would refer readers of this paper.
C. GENE SAMBERSON
138. Research of the cases reveals no decisions involving this issue.
139. "The Force Majeure Clause: A Tool for Mitigating the Effect of the Determin-
able Fee Concept of the Modern Oil and Gas Lease," 6 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 269, 284-87
(1959).
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